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Abstract. We empirically test the role of membership rules and voting schemes for climate
change coalitions with the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO). The model comprises
twelve world regions and captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation. We apply
three stability concepts that capture the notion of open membership and exclusive membership
with majority and unanimity voting. We show that exclusive membership leads to superior
outcomes than open membership and that unanimity voting is preferable to majority voting
in welfare and environmental terms. Our results suggest restricting membership in future
international environmental agreements and they provide a rationale for unanimity voting
as applied in many international organizations.
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Introduction
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are examples of collective
action to tackle global problems such as global warming. Game theoretic
analyses of the formation of IEAs stress the difficulties in designing self-
enforcing treaties because of free-riding. The presence of a strong free-rider
incentive prevents most IEAs of being stable and/or effective. The Kyoto
Protocol is a clear example of this problem. For studying these problems,
non-cooperative game theory has proved to be a very fruitful approach (e.g.,
Barrett, 1994, 1997; Bauer, 1992; Carraro & Siniscalco, 1993; Hoel, 1992,
Hoel & Schneider, 1997; Jeppesen & Andersen, 1998; Rubio & Ulph, 2003).1
Key results that emerge from this literature are: (a) only small coalitions are
stable and (b) whenever full cooperation (global optimum) would generate
large global welfare gains compared to no cooperation (Nash equilibrium),
stable partial cooperation achieves only little.
A stability concept that has been widely used in non-cooperative game
theory is “internal and external stability”. Internal stability means that no
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coalition member has an incentive to leave the agreement to become a
non-signatory. External stability means that no non-signatory has an in-
centive to join the agreement. This stability definition implies that coun-
tries can freely choose to join or leave the agreement. In particular, the
definition of external stability means that there is no restriction on mem-
bership. Thus, coalition formation may be seen as an open membership
game.
Open membership seems in line with evidence on IEAs. Almost all pro-
tocols of major IEAs have no provision that restricts membership. More-
over, intuition and results of the public goods literature suggest that global
welfare increases with participation in an agreement and therefore any re-
striction on membership would hamper the effectiveness of IEAs. However,
those results have been derived without considering the restriction that IEAs
have to be self-enforcing. Hence, in the presence of free-rider incentives,
it seems worthwhile to study the effect on coalition formation when mem-
bership is restricted. For instance from the empirical study of Botteon and
Carraro (1997) on global warming, it appears that some coalitions are inter-
nally but not externally stable. This suggests that some of these coalitions
could be stabilized if coalition members had the opportunity to deny acces-
sion of new potential entrants. Moreover, recent theoretical results by Finus
and Rundshagen (2003a, 2003b) obtained from a general framework suggest
that exclusive membership may help to stabilize IEAs. The reason is that –
though still internal instability poses a problem to IEAs – external instability
is less of a problem because members of an IEA under exclusive membership
can better control the accession of non-signatories that may upset a coali-
tion equilibrium. However, Finus and Rundshagen (2003a, 2003b) point out
that it is not possible to conclude at a general level what “more stability”
means in terms of the success of IEAs. Therefore, it is the purpose of this
paper to study by means of an empirical model the implications of exclusive
membership in terms of global welfare and environmental variables (global
emissions and stock of greenhouse gases). We consider two exclusive mem-
bership rules – one with (simple) majority voting and a second with unanimity
voting.
Hence, our analysis is in the tradition of the public choice theory that ana-
lyzes the effect of different voting procedures for instance in parliament and
various national and international organizations on the provision of public
goods.2 By and large, this literature has focused on voting schemes where a
given number of participants decide either on various policy options (plat-
forms) or on the level of a policy instrument. In this context, voting means for
instance deciding on new trade laws or whether and by how much tariff bar-
riers within WTO should be reduced, passing a resolution within the United
Nation Council and deciding on the implementation of antitrust laws within
the European Union.
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In contrast, our model makes a particular assumption on the policy level
and implicitly on the policy instrument, but analyzes voting on member-
ship. As will be outlined in more detail in Section ‘Theoretical background
of the model,’ our assumptions imply that coalition members do not only
choose their abatement strategies cost-efficiently but also optimal from cost-
benefit considerations of the coalition. Though we do not pay special atten-
tion to policy instruments, our assumption de facto implies that an efficient
policy instrument (e.g., a uniform tax) is implemented within a coalition
without compensation payments or any kind of redistribution of the gains
from cooperation. Thus, in our model, inefficiency stems from free-riding.
As mentioned previously, we consider stability under two membership rules
(open versus exclusive membership) and for exclusive membership we con-
sider two voting schemes: majority voting and unanimity voting. Our voting
schemes under exclusive membership are frequently applied in international
treaties (that are not necessarily public good agreements), like the NATO,
the European Union, WTO or the United Nations. For instance, NATO and
WTO vote by unanimity on new members. In addition, a new permanent
member in the Security Council is only accepted if there is no veto. The
decision on accession of 10 new member states in the European Union is
an example of different voting rules. First, accession had to be accepted
by the European Parliament by a simple majority and subsequently the
European Council had to approve the accession by unanimity (Euractiv,
2003).
We believe that our paper extends previous work in several directions.
First, we consider stability of IEAs not only under open membership but
also under exclusive membership and different voting rules. Second, we
confirm several conclusions of theory that have been derived under very
restrictive assumptions (e.g., symmetric countries or heterogeneous coun-
tries with two types of countries). Third, our analysis captures important
long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation that have been ignored by
the non-cooperative game theoretic literature on coalition formation by and
large.3 Fourth, in contrast to other empirical studies (e.g., Botteon & Carraro,
1997), our analysis captures a sufficient number of different actors (12 re-
gions) that makes the strategic interaction in the context of global warming
interesting.
In the following, we lay out the game theoretical part of the model in Sec-
tion ‘Theoretical background of the model’ and the empirical part in Section
‘Empirical background of the model’. In Section ‘Results of the base case’,
we discuss environmental and welfare aspects of coalition formation of our
base case scenario and in Section ‘Sensitivity analysis’ we report on results of
various sensitivity analyses. Section ‘Summary and conclusions’ summarizes
the main findings, draws policy conclusions and concludes with some remarks
about future research issues.
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Theoretical Background of the Model
The structure of coalition formation
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, coun-
tries or regions i ∈ I decide on their membership in a coalition; in the second
stage, coalition members choose their abatement strategies. In the first stage,
we assume that countries can choose between two membership strategies:
strategy σi = 0 means “I do not want to sign the agreement” and σi = 1
means “I want to become a member of a climate treaty”. This implies that
countries that announce σi = 0 (non-signatories) form a singleton coalition
and those that announce σi = 1 (signatories) become members of a non-
trivial coalition (i.e., a coalition of at least two members). A particular set
of announcements leads to a coalition structure (i.e., partition of players)
c = (cS, 1, . . . , 1). If country i and j are members of cS in coalition structure
c = (cS, 1, . . . , 1), we will call this simply a coalition between country i and
j ; if cS = {i}, we call this the “singleton coalition structure” and if cS = I ,
we call this the “grand coalition”.
In the second stage, countries choose their abatement strategies based on
the following payoff function:
πi (q) =
T∑
t=1
(1 + ri )−t (Bit(qt ) − ACit(qit)) (1)
where T denotes the time horizon, t = 1, . . . , T , ri is the discount rate of
country i , Bit are benefits from global abatement qt =
∑N
i=1 qit, ACit are
abatement costs from individual abatement qit and q is an abatement vector.
Benefits from global abatement are derived from reduced environmental dam-
ages caused by greenhouse gas emissions. We make the standard assumption:
∀i ∈ I , qit ∈ [0, eBAUit ] and at each time t : B ′it > 0, B ′′it ≤ 0, AC ′it > 0 and
AC ′it > 0 where primes denote first and second derivatives and eBAUit is the
emission level in the business-as-usual scenario with no abatement.
In Section ‘Empirical background of the model,’ we will lay out in detail
how global abatement relates to global emissions and the stock of greenhouse
gases and how this affects payoffs. At this stage, it suffices to note that we
follow the standard assumption in coalition theory that countries belonging
to the same coalition maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition (Bloch,
1997). In our context, this implies that non-signatories maximize their own
payoff and signatories maximize the sum of payoffs of the members of the
agreement. That is, signatories behave cooperatively within their coalition
but non-cooperatively against non-signatories. Hence, abatement strategies
within coalition cS are efficiently chosen. Consequently, the singleton coali-
tion structure (grand coalition) implies an equilibrium abatement strategy
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vector corresponding to the “classical” Nash equilibrium (global optimum).
Thus, the highest global payoff will be obtained in the grand coalition. For
the calibration of the payoff functions (also called net benefit functions) – on
which we report in Section ‘Empirical background of the model’ – it turns out
that the equilibrium abatement vector q∗ (for all coalition structures c ∈ C) is
unique and lies well within the boundaries of the abatement space as defined
above (qit ∈ [0, eBAUit ]).
Since the strategies in the second stage are fixed, the entire coalition for-
mation game reduces to one single stage. This reduced stage game looks as
follows: each country chooses its membership strategy, σi , the strategy vector
σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) is mapped into coalition structure c, leading to valuations
υ = (υ1, . . . , υN ), i.e., a payoff vector associated with a particular coalition
structure. Hence, stability can be defined in terms of membership strategies σ .
Stability of coalition structures
Regardless of the membership rule, a coalition structure is only called stable
if it satisfies the condition of internal stability. Internal stability means that
no country i that is a member of coalition cS because it announced σ ∗i = 1
(signatory) has an incentive to change its announcement to σi = 0 (and hence
becoming a non-signatory), given the announcements of all other countries
σ ∗−i . However, a stable coalition structure must also satisfy the condition of
external stability. Under open membership, external stability means that no
singleton j that announced σ ∗j = 0 (non-signatory) has an incentive to change
its announcement to σ j = 1 (and hence becoming a signatory), given the
announcements of all other countries σ ∗− j . Clearly, if a coalition structure is
externally stable under open membership, it will also be stable under exclusive
membership. However, suppose that there is an incentive for a non-signatory
to join coalition cS (implying instability under open membership). Then, under
exclusive membership, current members will vote on accession. Under major-
ity voting, accession will only be accepted if a majority of current signatories
benefits from accession, under unanimity, this is only the case if all members
are better off after accession than before. Hence, it is evident that it is more
difficult to upset an equilibrium coalition structure under exclusive member-
ship than under open membership and under exclusive membership it is more
difficult to upset an equilibrium under unanimity voting than under majority
voting. Thus, abbreviating the set of equilibrium coalition structures under
open membership, exclusive membership with majority voting and exclusive
membership with unanimity voting by C(OM), C(EM-M) and C(EM-U), then
C(OM) ⊂ C(EM-M) ⊂ C(EM-U) must hold by simple theoretical reasoning.
Therefore, the interesting question is: what does “more or less stability” imply
for coalition formation and, in particular, what are the environmental and wel-
fare implications? At a theoretical level, this question can only be answered
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for very restrictive assumptions such as symmetric payoff functions (see, e.g.,
Finus & Rundshagen, 2003a, 2003b). Therefore, it is important to analyze
this question in an empirical context as we do in Sections ‘Results of the base
case’ and ‘Sensitivity analysis’.
Note finally that modeling coalition formation game as an announcement
game implies that existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed: the singleton
coalition structure is stable by definition. The reason is simple: suppose each
country announces σi = 0, then no single country can induce another coalition
structure by changing its announcement.
Empirical Background of the Model
Introduction
In this section, we describe the calibration of payoff function (1). The philos-
ophy behind the construction of our empirical model comprises two items.
First, the model must be simple enough to be tractable for a game theoreti-
cal analysis. Nevertheless, it should reflect important results and features of
climate models in terms of the development of global emissions and concen-
tration over some period. Therefore, we base our calibration in this respect
on the widely known DICE-model by Nordhaus (1994). Second, in order to
make the model interesting for a game theoretic analysis, there should be
a sufficient number of different players. We consider twelve world regions.
Since this requires disaggregated information on benefit and abatement cost
functions, we rely on damage cost estimates of Fankhauser (1995) and Tol
(1997) and abatement cost estimates of Ellerman and Decaux (1998). We set
up an empirical model that we call STAbility of COalitions model, hence-
forth abbreviated STACO. STACO captures essential features of the long-run
effects of greenhouse gas accumulation, but in a simple way.
In the following, we proceed in five steps. First, we describe the rela-
tion between emissions and stock of greenhouse gases. Second, we discuss
damages implied by concentration. Third, we show how we derive benefit
functions from damage cost functions. Fourth, we report on the calibration
of the abatement cost functions. Fifth, we discuss the implications of the first
four steps for our payoff function and computations of valuations for different
coalition structures. All parameters are reported in the appendix; a detailed
description of the model is available from the authors upon request (Dellink,
Finus, van Ierland, and Altamirano-Cahrera, 2003).
Emissions and concentration
In our analysis, we focus on carbon dioxide, but the exogenous level of other
greenhouse gases is included in the calibration of the damage cost function
101
(Nordhaus, 1994). For the development of emissions and the stock of carbon
dioxide in the business-as-usual-scenario (BAU), we base our calibration on
the market scenario in DICE. This scenario assumes no emission reduction,
though there is a feedback between the environment and the economy. In
DICE, global emissions grow non-constantly over time. However, it turns out
that a linear specification of uncontrolled global emissions (et ) provides an
excellent fit for the development of the stock of carbon dioxide:
et+1 = et + dE (2)
where dE denotes the uncontrolled annual absolute growth of global emis-
sions, and et =
∑N
i=1 eit. Our analysis starts in 2010 and covers a period
of 100 years in order to capture the long-run effects of the global warming
problem. Thus, with reference to Equation (1), t = 2011, . . . , T = 2110. For
the starting value of emissions in 2010, we choose the value of DICE, which
amounts to 11.96 gigatons CO2. We estimate dE in order to get the best fit
for the development of stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, Mt , in the
market scenario of the DICE model.4 This gives dE = 0.153 gigatons per
year.
The stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at time t is expressed in the
standard way by the following equation:
Mt (q2011, . . . , qt ) = Mpre-ind + (1 − δ)t−2010 · (M2010 − Mpre-ind)
+
t∑
s=2011
((1 − δ)t−s · ω · (es − qs)) (3)
That is, the stock at time t , Mt , depends on global emission and abatement
from time t = 2011 onwards, q2011, . . . , qt where qt =
∑N
i=1 qit. More specif-
ically, the stock depends on three terms. The first term is the pre-industrial
stock, Mpre-ind, which is 590 gigatons CO2 according to DICE. This stock
remains constant over time and may be interpreted as the “natural equilib-
rium”. The second term is the stock in 2010 in excess of the pre-industrial
stock that decays with a rate δ per annum. The “natural removal or decay rate”
as well as the stock in 2010 are taken from DICE and are δ = 0.00866 and
M2010 = 835 gigatons CO2, respectively. The third term constitutes that part
of the stock that is due to global (BAU) emissions es , which grow according to
(2), minus global abatement after 2010, qs . The airborne fraction of total net
emissions (BAU-emissions minus abatement) that remains in the atmosphere
is 64% (ω = 0.64) according to DICE, which decays with rate δ = 0.00866
per annum.
For game theoretical tractability, we assume stationary abatement strate-
gies, which implies that optimal annual emission reduction by region,
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qit = qi/100, is constant over time. Again, a comparison with simulations
with DICE shows that the bias introduced through this simplification is of
minor importance when considering aggregate effects.
Benefit functions
In DICE global damages depend on world temperature increase, Tt , global
GDP, Yt , and parameter γD that measures the impact on GDP due to an increase
in temperature of 3 ◦C compared to the pre-industrial level.
Dt = γD ·
[
Tt
3
]2
· Yt (4)
However, in order to establish a direct link between concentration and dam-
ages, we follow Germain and van Steenberghe (2001) who use the following
approximation of the full climate module:
Tt = η · ln
(
Mt
Mpre-ind
)
(5)
where η is a parameter. Substituting (5) into (4), gives:
Dt =
(
γD
9
)
·
[
η · ln
(
Mt
Mpre-ind
)]2
· Yt (6)
In DICE, it is assumed that a doubling of the carbon dioxide concentration
(2 · Mpre-ind) leads to an increase in temperature of 3 ◦C.5 Thus from (5),
η = 3/ ln(2), which leads to:
Dt =
[
1
ln(2) · ln
(
Mt
Mpre-ind
)]2
· (γD · Yt ) (7)
Though this damage function is non-linear, it can be approximated by a
linear function in the relevant range of our study, that is, between the stock in
2010 (1.4 times pre-industrial level) and the estimated uncontrolled level in
2110 (3.5 times pre-industrial level):
Dt =
[
γ1 + γ2 ·
(
Mt
Mpre-ind
)]
· (γD · Yt ) (8)
where γ1 and γ2 are calculated via OLS-regression.6 As the stock of carbon
dioxide (see Equation (3)) is linear in abatement assuming stationary reduction
strategies, damages as specified in Equation (8) are also linear in abatement.
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Nordhaus (1994) assumes for the scale parameter γD a value of 0.0133, that is,
damages amount to 1.33% of GDP. However, it is known that the DICE value
is relatively low. Therefore, we use the more recent estimate of Tol (1997)
who estimates damage costs of 2.7% of GDP for a doubling of concentration
and hence γD = 0.027.
Noticing that benefits from abatement can be interpreted as the difference
between damages without and with abatement
Bt (q) = Dt (Mt (q = 0)) − Dt (Mt (q > 0)) (9)
and summing (9) over all periods, assuming a discount rate of 2%, gives dis-
counted global benefits of emission reduction TB(q) = 37.40 · q in period
2010–2110. This implies discounted marginal global benefits of 37.40 US$
per ton CO2. This figure is in line with results by Plambeck and Hope (1996),
who report that their best estimates of marginal global benefits of emissions re-
duction in a regional scenario fall within the range of 10–48 US$ per ton CO2.
In a final step, we have to allocate global benefits from abatement to the var-
ious world regions based on the assumption that TBi (q) = si ·TB(q) where si
is the share of region i . We consider 12 regions: USA, Japan, European Union
(EU-15), other OECD countries (O-OECD), Eastern European countries (EE),
former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China, India,
dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil and “rest of the world” (ROW).
In the following, we use the abbreviations in brackets.7 The allocation is a
difficult task since no source of regional benefit estimates (reduced regional
damage costs) is available that exactly matches with our regions. However,
two sources come relatively close to our regional specification: Fankhauser
(1995) and Tol (1997). Both estimate monetized damages for a doubling
of CO2 concentrations for various world regions, including damages due to
increased mortality rates, species and ecosystem losses, changes in agricul-
tural yields, sea level rise and extreme weather events. However, due to the
large uncertainties involved, regional estimates vary substantially between
both sources. Thus, we use both sources to derive regional shares of global
benefits from emission reduction as displayed in Table 1.8
Derivation of abatement cost functions
For the specification of the abatement cost function, we rely on estimates
of the EPPA model that are reported in Ellerman and Decaux (1998). They
assume an annual abatement cost function of the following form:
ACit(qit) = 13 · αi · (qit)
3 + 1
2
· βi · (qit)2 (10)
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Table 1. Emissions, benefit and abatement cost parameters
Regions
Emissions in
2010 (Gton)
Share of global
benefits si
Abatement cost
parameter αi
Abatement cost
parameter βi
USA 2.42 0.226 0.0005 0.00398
Japan 0.56 0.173 0.0155 0.18160
European Union 1.4 0.236 0.0024 0.01503
Other OECD Countries 0.62 0.035 0.0083 0
Eastern European 0.51 0.013 0.0079 0.00486
Countries
Former Soviet Union 1 0.068 0.0023 0.00042
Energy Exporting 1.22 0.030 0.0032 0.03029
Countries
China 2.36 0.062 0.00007 0.00239
India 0.63 0.050 0.0015 0.00787
Dynamic Asian 0.41 0.025 0.0047 0.03774
Economies
Brazil 0.13 0.015 0.5612 0.84974
Rest of the World 0.7 0.068 0.0021 0.00805
World 11.96
∑
si = 1
We can use their estimates but have to adjust their figures in four respects.
First, we have to account for the fact that their abatement cost estimates are
in million US$ per megaton greenhouse gas reduction whereas our unit of
measurement is billion US$ per gigaton.9 Second, we replace qit by qi/100 in
(10) because we assume stationary strategies (qi,2011 = . . . = qi,2110). Third,
they estimate a negative value for the parameter αi for OOE. Since this would
cause problems for computations, we set αi = 0 in this case and re-estimate
βi for OOE. All estimates are displayed in the last two columns in Table 1.
Fourth, in our model abatement means emission reduction with respect to
BAU-emissions. Thus, we allocate total initial emissions of 11.96 gigatons
(see Table 1) to the 12 regions, using the shares of Ellerman and Decaux
(1998). This gives the numbers in the second column in Table 1. This im-
plies that we assume not only global emissions to grow linearly with dE (see
Equation (2)) but also regional emissions, however, according to their shares
in global emissions.
In order to derive total abatement costs of region i , TACi (qi ), we sum
(10) over t = 2011, . . . , 2110 and discount with discount rate r , TACi (qi ) =∑2110
t=2011 (1 + r )−(t−2010)ACit(qi ). This implies that we assume the same abate-
ment cost structure throughout, neglecting possible exogenous or endoge-
nous cost efficiency effects. Noting that because of stationary strategies, we
can write TACi (qi ) = ACit(qi ) ·
∑2110
t=2011 (1 + r )−(t−2010) and discounting
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Figure 1. Marginal total abatement cost functions.
abatement costs with the same uniform discount rate of 2% as in the case
of benefits, we get TACi (qi ) = 43.1 · ACit(qi ) and marginal total abatement
costs of MTACi (qi ) = 43.1 · MACit(qi ) which are drawn in Figure 1.
From the graph, it is evident that marginal abatement costs never intersect
and that China and USA have the flattest curves whereas Brazil as well as
Japan the steepest.
Payoff function
Using the information of Sections ‘Benefit functions’ and ‘Derivation of abate-
ment cost functions’, gives the following payoff function:
πi = TBi (q) − TACi (qi ) (11)
Since we consider 12 world regions, this gives rise to 4096 different mem-
bership strategy vectors in the first stage of the coalition formation game.
However, since a strategy vector where only one region announces σi = 1 and
all other regions announce σi = 0 leads to the same coalition structure as if all
regions announce σi = 0, the set of coalition structures, C , comprises “only”
4084 different coalition structures. For each coalition structure, we compute
valuations according to the assumption of the second stage of the coalition
formation game that coalition members jointly maximize the aggregate pay-
off to their coalition (see Section ‘Theoretical background of the model’).
For coalition structure c = (cS, 1, . . ., 1), ∑i∈cs MTBi (q) = MTACi (qi )
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holds for a member i of coalition cS in equilibrium and for a singleton j
MTB j (q) = MTAC j (q j ). Thus, joining coalition cS has the advantage that
own abatement efforts are matched by other members, implying higher bene-
fits, but also higher abatement costs. The relation of the benefit and cost effect
determines whether a coalition is stable, which is checked in Section ‘Results
of the base case.’
Since our specification of TBi (q) implies a linear function and hence con-
stant marginal benefits, signatories and non-signatories have dominant abate-
ment strategies. That is, optimal abatement strategies of a region or group of
regions are independent of those of other regions. This implies that if regions
form a coalition, and thereby increasing their abatement efforts, this is not
offset by a reduction of abatement efforts by outsiders. In other words, in
our model no leakage effects occur. According to theory (Carraro & Sinis-
calco, 1998; Finus, 2003), this is the most favorable condition for forming
stable coalitions. Nevertheless, as will be apparent from subsequent sections,
cooperation proves very difficult.
Finally, note that in the context of our empirical model, individual ratio-
nality is a necessary condition for internal stability of a coalition and hence a
necessary condition under open but also under exclusive membership. Indi-
vidual rationality implies that all signatories must receive a higher payoff than
in the singleton coalition structure. Hence, if this condition is violated for at
least one signatory, we can immediately conclude that this coalition cannot
be stable, regardless of the membership rule.10
Results of the Base Case
Introduction
From the previous discussion, it is evident that in particular the estimation of
benefits from global abatement is associated with some uncertainty. This con-
cerns primarily the level of damages (that translates into the level of benefits
from abatement) represented by the parameter γD. Hence, we discuss first the
“base case” value of γD = 0.027 in Section ‘Results of the base case’ and
then conduct a sensitivity analysis in Section ‘Sensitivity analysis’ where we
consider different levels of this value.
In order to gain insight in the fundamental features of our model, we
discuss first three benchmark scenarios in subsection ‘Benchmark scenarios’:
(1) the singleton coalition structure, implying no cooperation. (2) The grand
coalition, implying full cooperation. (3) The Kyoto coalition that constitutes
partial cooperation. Here we assume that the members of the original Kyoto
Protocol (before the USA withdrew from the Protocol) form a coalition, which
includes USA, Japan, the European Union (EU-15), other OECD countries
(O-OECD), Eastern European countries (EE) and the former Soviet Union
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(FSU). Subsequently, we report on results of our stability check (subsection
‘Stability analysis’).
Benchmark Scenarios
Singleton coalition structure
Table 2 reports results if each region acts by itself, corresponding to the
“classical” Nash equilibrium with no cooperation. In equilibrium, marginal
abatement costs are equal to marginal benefits for each region. Annual global
emission reduction amounts to only 4.6%. This implies a global stock of
CO2 of 1,561 gigatons in 2110. This is about 2.5 times of the pre-industrial
level. At the level of individual regions, it is evident that annual emission
reductions vary widely. The reason is large differences in marginal abatement
cost curves (see Figure 1 and Table 1, Section ‘Empirical background of the
model’) and marginal benefits from abatement (see Table 1, Section ‘Empirical
background of the model’) between regions. For instance, USA has a relatively
flat marginal abatement cost curve. Hence, in the absence of cooperation,
USA has an incentive to reduce annual emissions by 6.7% because of her
high marginal benefits from abatement. A similar argument applies to China
Table 2. Singleton coalition structure (Nash Equilibrium)
Regions
Total
emission
reduction
Annual
emission
reduction
Total
abatement
costs
Total
benefits
from
abatement
Benefits
minus
abatement
costs
Marginal
abatement
costs
Marginal
benefits
Gton (over percentage of bln US$ bln US$ bln US$ US$/ton US$/ton
100 years) emissions over 100 over 100 over 100
in 2010 years years years
USA 16 6.7 53 468 415 8.5 8.5
Japan 1 1.4 2 357 354 6.5 6.5
EU-15 7 4.7 24 488 464 8.8 8.8
O-OECD 2 3.1 1 71 71 1.3 1.3
EE 1 1.8 0 27 27 0.5 0.5
FSU 5 4.9 4 140 135 2.5 2.5
EEX 1 0.7 0 62 62 1.1 1.1
China 15 6.6 16 128 112 2.3 2.3
India 3 5.3 3 103 101 1.9 1.9
DAE 1 1.3 0 52 51 0.9 0.9
Brazil 0 0.1 0 32 32 0.6 0.6
ROW 4 5.3 4 141 137 2.5 2.5
World 55 4.6 109 2,069 1,960
Global stock of carbon dioxide by 2110 = 1,561 Gton. EE = Eastern European countries,
EEX = energy exporting countries, DAE = dynamic Asian economies.
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that has an even flatter marginal abatement cost curve, though lower marginal
benefits from abatement compared to USA. In contrast, regions like Brazil and
dynamic Asian economies (DAE) have virtually no incentive at all to conduct
emission reductions by themselves because of steep marginal abatement cost
curves and low marginal benefits from abatement.
Grand coalition
Table 3 displays results for the grand coalition that corresponds to the “clas-
sical” global optimum with full cooperation. In equilibrium, marginal abate-
ment costs are equal across countries and amount to 37.4 US$/ton – a value
that is in the range of many other empirical studies (e.g., Weyant, 1999). At
the aggregate level, the reduction of annual emission reductions amount to
21.4%, exceeding those in the singleton coalition structure by a substantial
amount. Nevertheless, the effect on the final stock of CO2 is only moderate –
a feature reminiscent also to most computable general equilibrium models: it
amounts to a reduction of only 5.5% compared to the singleton case and 6.9%
compared to BAU. The reason is that the airborne fraction of CO2-emissions
that remains in the atmosphere is only 64% and the annual natural removal
rate of 0.86% levels off differences between both scenarios over a period of
100 years. However, the gains from cooperation are considerable: the total
payoff (benefits minus abatement costs) in the grand coalition is 6,031 billion
US$, which implies a gain of 208% compared to the singleton coalition struc-
ture. This figure highlights the relevance of cooperation in the case of climate
change.
A closer inspection of individual regions reveals that, in terms of total
emission reduction, China, USA and India have to contribute more than other
regions to a globally optimal solution due to their flat marginal abatement cost
curves. For Eastern European countries (EE) and China, a globally optimal
solution would not be individually rational since these regions would loose
compared to the Nash equilibrium as it is indicated by bold faced figures in
Table 3, column 6. Those regions have to contribute much to cooperation
but benefit only little in the form of reduced damages. Therefore, it is clear
that the grand coalition is not stable. Moreover, a more detailed analysis
considering the last column of Table 3 reveals that all regions, except Japan and
the European Union (EU-15), have an incentive to leave the grand coalition.
Considering the absolute amount of the gains from leaving the grand coalition
suggests that most regions face a strong free-rider incentive.
Kyoto coalition
Table 4 displays results for the Kyoto coalition. According to our assump-
tion, this implies that the first six regions (indicated in italics in Table 4)
jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition and therefore marginal
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abatement costs of these regions are equal. The annual global emission re-
duction is substantially lower than in the global optimum but almost twice
as high as in the Nash equilibrium. Also the global gain from cooperation is
with 3,140 billion US$, 60% higher than in the Nash equilibrium.
However, regardless of the membership rule, the Kyoto coalition is not
stable since internal stability is violated. First, individual rationality is vio-
lated for three coalition members: other OECD countries (O-OECD), Eastern
European countries (EE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) would be worse
off than in the singleton coalition structure as indicated by bold faced num-
bers in Table 4, column 6. Second, not only these regions but also the USA
have an incentive to leave the coalition, as it is evident from the last column
in Table 4. This result together with our finding that the USA will already
conduct relative high abatement without cooperation (see Table 2) helps to
explain the decision of President Bush to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol
and his announcement to pursue, nevertheless, an “active” national climate
policy.11
Not surprising, all six outsiders are better off than in the Nash equilibrium
since they benefit from the abatement efforts of the Kyoto coalition. More
surprising is the fact that none of the outsiders has an incentive to join the
coalition which follows from the negative number in the last column in Table 4.
The reason is that if already six regions have formed a coalition, joining would
imply a substantial increase of abatement efforts for a potential entrant but
only a marginal additional benefit from reduced emissions.
Stability analysis
We checked all 4084 coalition structures for stability under open membership,
exclusive membership with majority voting and exclusive membership with
unanimity voting with an algorithm programmed with the software package
Matlab. We found no non-trivial coalition structure that is stable under open
membership.12 Whereas more than 800 coalition structures are externally
stable (under open membership), only 14 coalition structures are internally
stable. Thus, it seems that the main problem of cooperation is internal insta-
bility due to the presence of strong free-rider incentives to leave a coalition.
Nevertheless, under exclusive membership and majority voting at least one out
of the 14 internally stable coalitions is externally stable of which the results
are displayed in Table 5.
From Table 5, it is evident that internal stability holds “at the margin”. Each
of the three members (indicated in italics) would only slightly loose by leaving
the coalition as shown in the last column. Moreover, each member only slightly
gains compared to the singleton coalition structure (see Table 2). Of course,
non-signatories gain more since they benefit from additional abatement efforts
of the coalition without carrying additional abatement costs.
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Overall, this coalition only marginally improves upon the singleton case.
Global net benefits are 2,131 billion US$ whereas in the singleton coalition
structure they are 1,960 billion US$. This implies only an improvement of
8.7%, a rather modest contribution to tackle global warming given that the
global optimum would imply an improvement of almost 208%. In other words,
stable partial cooperation can only slightly reduce the gap between the Nash
equilibrium and the global optimum – a phenomenon confirmed by all other
results discussed below. The reason is closely related to the fundamental
features of coalition formation.
Internal stability will only hold for coalitions that slightly increase their
abatement efforts compared to the singleton coalition structure. If abatement
efforts were more ambitious, the free-rider incentive would become too strong
so that internal stability would fail to hold. For instance, in the context of a
coalition between FSU, Brazil and ROW, all three members have relatively
high marginal abatement costs compared to marginal benefits from abatement.
Hence, these regions increase their abatement efforts only slightly compared
to the singleton coalition structure. Consequently, annual global emission
reduction is 5.1%, which is only slightly higher than in the singleton coalition
structure, which amounts to 4.6%. Thus, the conjecture would be wrong that
stable coalitions are formed by the “good guys” and outsiders are the “bad
guys”. For instance, Brazil’s annual emission reduction is 1.1 percent in this
coalition whereas the outsiders USA, European Union (EU-15) and China
reduce their emissions on average by 6.7, 4.7 and 6.6%, respectively.
In terms of external stability, it is evident that only USA, Japan and EU-15
have an incentive to join the coalition formed by FSU, Brazil and ROW. The
reason is that the potential entrants would receive a large portion of the gains
from joint cooperation: these regions have high marginal benefits from global
abatement compared to their contribution to joint abatement in a coalition
(because of relatively steep marginal abatement cost curves). It is exactly for
this reason why their application for accession is turned down by a majority
of regions in the coalition.
The explanations about internal stability also help to rationalize participa-
tion in stable coalitions. Only coalitions including members that agree on low
abatement targets and where members exhibit a similar cost-benefit structure
are stable (e.g., FSU, Brazil, ROW). High abatement targets would imply a
high free-rider incentive. A heterogeneous cost-benefit structure (e.g., includ-
ing additionally USA, Japan or EU-15) would imply an asymmetric distribu-
tion of the gains from cooperation, putting some countries at disadvantage,
which have therefore an incentive to leave the coalition.
Of course, by definition, the coalition between FSU, Brazil and ROW
is also stable under unanimity voting. However, the following two coalition
structures, listed in Tables 6 and 7, are only stable under exclusive membership
and unanimity voting, but not under majority voting.
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From Tables 6 and 7, it is evident that most observations and conclusions
from above also apply for a coalition between China and dynamic Asian
economies (DAE) and a coalition between energy exporting countries (EEX)
and China.13 First, internal stability for coalition members only holds at the
margin. Second, both coalitions only marginal improve upon the singleton
coalition structure in terms of abatement and global net benefits. Third, USA,
Japan and the European Union (EU-15) are those regions with the strongest
incentive to join the coalition, which can only be “neutralized” by unanimity
vote.
Viewed together, three important conclusions emerge from the stability
analysis of the base case. First, not surprisingly, our theoretical prediction
C(OM) ⊂ C(EM-M) ⊂ C(EM-U) is confirmed in our empirical analysis.
Whereas no non-trivial coalition is stable under open membership, one non-
trivial coalition is stable under exclusive membership and majority voting and
two other additional coalitions are stable under unanimity voting. However,
a more interesting fact is that those additional coalitions are superior in net
benefit and environmental terms. The coalition between the former Soviet
Union (FSU), Brazil and the “rest of the world” (ROW), which is only stable
under exclusive membership but not under open membership, implies total
abatement of 60 gigatons CO2 over 100 years and total net benefits of 2,131
billion US$. In contrast, in the Nash equilibrium this is 55 gigatons CO2 and
1,960 billion US$. Moreover, additional coalitions that are only stable under
exclusive membership and unanimity voting (but not majority voting) consti-
tute a further improvement. Hence, exclusive membership leads to superior
outcomes than open membership and unanimity voting leads to superior out-
comes than majority voting.
Second, stable coalitions that constitute partial cooperation only marginally
close the gap between the Nash equilibrium and the global optimum if this
gap is large. As argued above, in our context the gap in net benefits is large
in absolute and relative terms since global net benefits in the global optimum
are 6,031 billion US$ and in the Nash equilibrium 1,960 billion US$. This
implies that net benefits are 208% higher in the global optimum than in the
Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the coalitions between FSU, Brazil and ROW,
China and DAE and EEX and China imply only an improvement in net benefits
of 8.7, 9.8 and 11.7%, respectively.
Third, despite the fact that the coalition between FSU, Brazil and ROW
counts one more member than the coalition between China and DAE and the
coalition between EEX and China, it is inferior in terms of global net bene-
fits and abatement. This indicates that success of an IEA cannot be inferred
from the number of participants. All three conclusions will be confirmed by
our sensitivity analysis on which we report in Section ‘Sensitivity analysis’
and where we argue that they are perfectly in line with results obtained by
theory.
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Sensitivity Analysis
A typical feature of empirical work is that results depend on parameter values,
which are subject to some uncertainty. Given the large number of parameters
that enter our model, some selection is necessary for a sensitivity analysis. We
believe that the highest uncertainty concerns benefits from global abatement.
Hence, we conduct a sensitivity analysis where we uniformly lower or raise
the level of benefits from global abatement. That is, we change the base value
of γD = 0.027. For instance, lowering global benefits to 50% compared to the
base case implies γD = 0.014, which is very close to the value estimated by
Nordhaus (1994). Raising this value to 200 and 300% implies higher benefits
compared to our base case value of γD = 0.027 (100%) taken from Tol (1997).
Table 8 summarizes the results for four scenarios: 50, 100, 200 and 300% of
γD = 0.027.
First, not only for our base case but also for all scenarios neither the grand
coalition structure nor the Kyoto coalition structure is stable regardless of the
definition of stability. Although both coalition structures would substantially
improve on the singleton coalition structure, some members have a strong
incentive to leave the coalition.
Second, partial cooperation is not stable under open membership for the
50% and 100% scenario. Only if we raise benefits sufficiently high, one coali-
tion between Japan and European Union (EU-15) is stable under open mem-
bership. Also under exclusive membership stability rises with the level of
benefits from global abatement. For instance, in the 50% scenario only one
non-trivial coalition structure is stable under exclusive membership and una-
nimity voting, three in the 100% scenario and four in the 200 and 300% sce-
narios. The reason is that higher benefits imply that regions already conduct
higher abatement in the Nash equilibrium so that partial cooperation requires
only small additional abatement efforts. Hence, the free-rider incentive in
terms of internal stability decreases with the level of benefits.
Third, and closely related to the second point, a conclusion that has been
derived from theoretical models under very restrictive assumptions (symmet-
ric countries or heterogeneous countries with only two types of countries) and
that has been called a paradox by Barrett (1994, 1997) is confirmed: whenever
cooperation would be needed most from a global point of view (the relative
gap between Nash equilibrium and the global optimum is large) stable partial
cooperation achieves only little. Under each scenario, the gap is large, and
regardless of the membership rule, the gap is at best only marginally closed
by stable coalitions.
Fourth, independent of the stability concept, if there are stable coalitions,
they are rather small. However, the number of participants is no indication of
the success of cooperation. Not only for the base case the coalition of three
members that is formed by former Soviet Union (FSU), Brazil and ROW is
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inferior to the coalition between China and dynamic Asian economies (DAE)
and energy exporting countries (EEX) and China, each comprising only two
members, but also in the scenarios 200 and 300%. Again, this result is in line
with findings of theory (see Finus, 2001, 2003 for details).
Fifth, not only for the base case but also for the other scenarios it is con-
firmed that exclusive membership leads to superior outcomes than open mem-
bership and that under exclusive membership unanimity voting leads to supe-
rior outcomes than majority voting.
Summary and Conclusions
We studied stability of climate change coalitions. We followed the standard
assumption in coalition theory that coalition members efficiently choose their
abatement levels as to jointly maximize aggregate net benefits to their coali-
tion. We departed from the standard definition of internal and external stability
that implies open membership and also considered exclusive membership with
two voting schemes: majority voting and unanimity voting. We applied these
different notions of stability to an empirical model, called STACO. This model
captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation but assumes station-
ary abatement strategies for game theoretic tractability. It covers the period
between 2010 and 2110 and comprises twelve world regions, giving rise to
4084 different coalition structures. Thus, though this model is far from being
perfect, it improves upon previous studies in that it captures more dynamic
aspects of the climate change problem and allows for a more detailed analysis
of the strategic interaction of many actors. We conducted several sensitivity
analyses (called scenarios) in order to test the robustness of our results.
First, in the case of global warming, the gains from cooperation prove to
be large in our model. This does not only hold in absolute but also in relative
terms when global net benefits in the global optimum are compared with those
in the Nash equilibrium. This stresses the importance of economic and game
theoretic analyses on global warming for future research.
Second, neither the grand coalition nor the Kyoto coalition (comprising
the countries of the original Kyoto Protocol before the USA withdrew from
this agreement) turned out to be stable for all scenarios regardless of the
membership rule and voting scheme, though both coalition structures would
substantially improve upon the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, those coalitions
that turned out to be stable only comprise few members and only marginally
improve upon the Nash equilibrium in terms of global net benefits, global
emissions and stock of greenhouse gases. This result provided some rationales
why it proves so difficult to achieve a high participation in the Kyoto Protocol
and to agree on ambitious and effective abatement targets. The more countries
accede to an agreement and/or the higher abatement targets, are the more
difficult it becomes to control free-riding. Thus, as long as no major changes of
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the underlying economic incentive structure occur, it seems that only moderate
progress can be expected in near future in the context of climate change.
However, it has to be pointed out that our pessimistic conclusion is based on
two assumptions. Dropping these assumptions is closely related to possible
policy measures that may foster stable and effective cooperation and that we
would like to analyze in future research.
One option is to drop the assumption of no transfers and include vari-
ous transfer schemes in the stability analysis as for instance in Buchner and
Carraro (2003) and Bosello, Buchner, Carraro, and Raggi (2004). This may
comprise direct monetary transfers as suggested by the meeting of parties to
the Kyoto Protocol in Marrakech. The proposal allows developing countries to
draw on financial resources from an environmental fund, as in the case of the
Montreal Protocol. However, transfers may also comprise indirect measures
as for instance permit trading (Article 17), clean development mechanism
(Article 12) and joint implementation (Articles 3 and 4). We suspect that all
kind of transfers will help to balance different interests between countries
(see, e.g., Botteon and Carraro, 1997; Barrett, 1997). In particular, we expect
a higher participation, which also allows to reap higher efficiency gains from
cooperation because stable coalitions can be formed by countries that are more
heterogeneous.
Another option is to drop the assumption of joint welfare maximization
that implies not only that cost efficient but also ambitious abatement targets
are implemented within coalitions. This is one important reason for instability
of large coalitions because of high free-rider incentives and an unequal distri-
bution of the gains from cooperation. Thus, it is likely that better results may
be achieved if members settle for less ambitious abatement targets and/or if
abatement burdens are allocated more equally (though cost-inefficiently). If
the effect on participation is strong enough, this may well compensate for in-
efficiencies. For instance, theoretical work by Endres and Finus (2002), Finus
and Rundshagen (1998) and Finus (2004) provide explanations why in many
IEAs abatement targets are specified as inefficient uniform emission reduction
quotas and signatories agree on the lowest common denominator (resulting
from unanimity voting) in terms of the joint abatement level. These extensions
could be further steps in including public choice aspects in the analysis of in-
ternational treaty formation that may help to rationalize inefficient designs of
many actual IEAs.
Third, we confirmed a theoretical result that has been derived under very
restrictive assumption: whenever the degree of externality – measured as the
relative difference between the Nash equilibrium (singleton coalition struc-
ture) and the global optimum (grand coalition) – is large, partial cooperation
is either not stable or achieves only little. Only if this difference is small
enough, more progress can be expected. In our model, this difference became
smaller when we (uniformly) raised benefits from global abatement. Then
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regions already conduct a substantial amount of abatement without any co-
operation, additional abatement requirements within a coalition are relatively
small and hence free-riding is less of a problem. From a policy point of view,
this suggests that the success of mitigating the global warming problem is
closely related to the perception of environmental damages of governments
and societies. Thus, measures that enhance environmental consciousness may
foster cooperation in the future.
Fourth, large stable coalitions may prove to be inferior compared to small
stable coalitions both in economic and environmental terms. This suggests
that a high participation in an IEA does not necessarily imply its success, as
frequently publicized by politicians and the media. Only a comparison of net
benefits of an agreement with an appropriate benchmark (Nash equilibrium
or business as usual scenario) allows to draw sound conclusions.
Fifth, stability proves generally very difficult under open membership
rule. We find only for some of our scenarios one coalition that is stable
under open membership. In contrast, some of the coalitions that are exter-
nally unstable under open membership turn out to be stable under exclusive
membership. Those additional stable coalitions under exclusive membership
generate higher global net benefits and a lower stock of greenhouse gases.
It turns out that unanimity voting leads to better outcomes than majority
voting.
From a theoretical point of view, this suggests not only that a modification
of the stability concept of internal and external stability is a fruitful route
for research, but also that previous results may have been overly pessimistic.
From an applied point of view, the results are interesting in two respects.
First, almost all past IEAs have no provision to restrict membership. Hence,
it may be worthwhile to think whether to adopt an exclusive membership
rule, which is typical for club good agreements, as for instance NATO and
European Union, also for pure public good agreements like those on climate
change in the future. Second, exclusive membership requires some degree
of consensus between coalition partners to form a coalition. At first glance,
intuition suggests that the higher the degree of consensus needed to come to a
decision, the less likely and successful an agreement will be. However, a closer
inspection reveals that when the free-rider problem is explicitly accounted for
this conclusion has to be questioned. This qualification is confirmed in the
literature that analyzes bargaining on environmental policy levels (e.g., Endres
1997; Endres & Finus 2002; Finus & Rundshagen, 1998) and is also confirmed
by our model that analyzes the effect of membership rules on the formation
of stable coalitions. In both cases, consensus agreements are associated with
more stability that is a basic prerequisite for any successful agreement. Hence,
our results provide a further rationale for the frequent application of consensus
voting and in particular for unanimity voting as applied in many international
organizations and agreements.
123
Appendix
Parameter values
Symbol Description Value Unit Source
e2010 Global emissions in
2010
11.96 Gton CO2 Nordhaus (1994)
ei,2010 Regional emissions
in year 2010
See Table 1 in
Section ‘Empirical
background of the
model’
Gton CO2 Own calculation
based on Ellerman
and Decaux (1998)
dE Annual growth in
global and regional
emissions in
BAU-scenario
0.153 Gton CO2 Own calculation
based on Nordhaus
(1994)
Mpre-ind Pre-industrial level of
CO2-stock
590 Gton CO2 Nordhaus (1994)
M2010 Stock of CO2 in 2010 835 Gton CO2 Nordhaus (1994)
δ Natural annual
removal or decay
rate of CO2-stock
0.00866 – Nordhaus (1994)
ω Airborne fraction of
emissions that
remain in the
atmosphere
0.64 Nordhaus (1994)
r Annual uniform
discount rate
0.02 – Assumption
si Share of region i in
global benefits
See Table 1 in
Section ‘Empirical
background of the
model’
– Own calculation
based on
Fankhauser (1995)
and Tol (1997)
αi Abatement cost
parameter of
region i
See Table 2 – Own calculation
based on Ellerman
and Decaux (1998)
βi Abatement cost
parameter of
region i
See Table 2 – Own calculation
based on Ellerman
and Decaux (1998)
γD Scale parameter of
damage and benefit
function
0.027 – Tol (1997)
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Notes
1. There is also a large literature applying cooperative game theory to study stability of IEAs
(see, e.g., Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997 and Germain, Toint, Tulkens, and de Zeeuw,
2000 and an overview in Finus, 2001, 2003). This literature is mainly normatively oriented
and has focused on measures to stabilize the efficient grand coalition implementing a
socially optimal emission or abatement vector.
2. In the general context see for instance Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Mueller (2003)
and McNutt (1996) and in the context of environmental policy Bo¨hringer and Vogt
(2004), Dijkstra (1999), Hahn (1989), Hillman and Ursprung (1994), Michaelowa (1998),
Michaelowa and Greiner (1996), Schneider and Volkert (1999), Sandler (1992) and Yandle
(1999).
3. Exceptions are for instance Bosello et al. (2001), Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo, and Mar-
chiori (2002), Rubio and Ulph (2003) and Tol (2001).
4. The error between the estimated stock and the stock according to DICE is smaller than
0.6% in all periods.
5. This is based on an exogenous additional impact of other greenhouse gases on radiative
forcing (see Nordhaus, 1994).
6. Given our interpretation of γD , damages equal γD · Yt for a doubling of concentrations.
Hence, we can impose γ1 = 1−2 ·γ2 and estimate γ2. OLS gives γ2 = 1.497 with standard
error 0.011 (t-value: 136.2) and adjusted R2 = 0.998, indicating an almost perfect fit.
7. EU-15 comprises the 15 countries of the European Union as of 1995. O-OECD includes
among other countries Canada, Australia and New Zealand. EE includes for instance Hun-
gary, Poland, and Czech Republic. EEX includes for example the Middle East Countries,
Mexico, Venezuela and Indonesia. DAE comprises South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and
Singapore. ROW includes for instance South Africa, Morocco and many countries in Latin
America and Asia. For details, see Babiker, Reilly, Mayer, Eckaus, Wing, and Hyman
(2001).
8. Since Fankhauser’s and Tol’s regional specifications do not completely match with ours,
some adjustment for our purposes is needed. Fankhauser’s estimates have been used for
industrialized countries, whereas for developing countries further disaggregation was based
on information from the study of Tol. Because of space limitations, the interested reader is
referred to the original papers of Fankhauser and Tol, and for the details of our adjustment
to our empirical background paper (Dellink et al. 2003) that is available upon request from
the authors.
9. In the specification of the STACO model all market values are expressed in billion US$ of
1985 using the deflator provided by NASA (2002). This applies to damages, benefits and
abatement costs.
10. A proof is available upon request from the authors.
11. It should be pointed out that our analysis does not consider permit trading. However, at the
time of the withdrawal of the USA, it was still under discussion whether a permit trading
system will be established at all and whether trade will be unrestricted.
12. A non-trivial coalition structure includes a coalition with at least two members. In the
following, we concentrate in the stability analysis on these coalition structures since the
singleton coalition structure is stable by definition. See Section ‘Theoretical background
of the model.’
13. It does not seem evident which of the two coalitions will form. On the one hand, China has
a slight preference to form a coalition with DAE instead of with EEX. On the other hand,
DAE prefers a coalition between China and EEX and EEX prefers a coalition between
China and DAE.
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